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GROUP COHESION UNDER INDIVIDUAL REGULATORY
CONSTRAINTS
DELIA COCULESCU AND FREDDY DELBAEN
Abstract. We consider a group consisting of N business units. We suppose there are
regulatory constraints for each unit, more precisely, the net worth of each business unit is
required to belong to a set of acceptable risks, assumed to be a convex cone. Because of these
requirements, there are less incentives to operate under a group structure, as creating one
single business unit, or altering the liability repartition among units, may allow to reduce the
required capital. We analyse the possibilities for the group to benefit from a diversification
effect and economise on the cost of capital. We define and study the risk measures that allow
for any group to achieve the minimal capital, as if it were a single unit, without altering
the liability of business units, and despite the individual admissibility constraints. We call
these risk measures cohesive risk measures.
1. Introduction
We consider an insurance group structured in N ≥ 2 business units. Each unit i has some
exogenous liability, modelled as a random variable Xi ≥ 0 on a probability space (Ω,F ,P).
We suppose that the net worth of each unit is subject to constraints, e.g. that are set by
a regulator, namely it needs to belong to a certain set A of “acceptable positions”. We
consider that A is a convex cone so that the functional ρ : L1(Ω,F ,P)→ R:
ρ(ξ) = inf{m : ξ +m ∈ A}
is a coherent risk measure (see [1]).
Whenever the aggregation of the units’ liabilities is possible, the group is only required
to hold the capital ρ
(
−
∑N
i=1Xi
)
. By convexity of ρ we have that ρ
(
−
∑N
i=1Xi
)
≤∑N
i=1 ρ (−Xi), which reflects the fact that the group would achieve a lower required cap-
ital as compared with N separated entities with the same liabilities. In this situation, risk
aggregation is beneficial because it reduces the capital.
In this paper we are assuming that there are legal or geographical limitations that prevent
risk transfers or aggregation of liability to take place with the aim of reducing the regulatory
capital. Each business unit must face the regulatory requirements individually. At the group
level nevertheless, it is possible to manage the available capital and make certain monetary
transfers to compensate for losses occurring at time 1 within the different business units.
The set of all such possible monetary compensations will be called admissible payoffs. For
instance, when at the group level the available capital is m > 0, then the set of admissible
payoffs will be denoted by AX(m); it contains the nonnegative, N dimensional random
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vectors Y = (Y1, ..., YN) such that
∑
i Yi = m, and fulfilling some additional rules specifying
the payment priority of the different units (as given in Definition 4 below).
In this framework, unit i receives a payoff Yi so that its net worth is Yi − Xi. The
lowest overall capital that the group needs to hold when it has liability given by the vector
X = (X1, ..., XN) is:
K(X) := inf{m ≥ 0 | ∃Y ∈ AX(m), ∀i, Yi −Xi ∈ A}. (1.1)
In general, when the business units are facing such individual admissibility constraints, it
is the case that the cost of capital K(X) is higher than the minimal cost obtained with
aggregating the risks, ρ
(
−
∑N
i=1Xi
)
. Hence, the existence of individual constraints reduces
the benefit of being a group. In such circumstances the incentives are to organise the business
differently, as a unique entity, or form some optimised subgroups, depending on the liability
vector.
The topic of this paper, is to characterise the acceptability sets A that satisfy the property
K(X) = ρ
(
−
N∑
i=1
Xi
)
, ∀X ∈ (L∞)N . (1.2)
We will show that the relation (1.2) is rather restrictive. We call the corresponding risk
measures cohesive, as any group requires the same amount of capital as if it were a single
entity, despite the impossibility to aggregate liability to take advantage of the convexity of the
regulatory constraint. When the risk measure is cohesive, the group benefits of the maximal
diversification gain, as if it were a single entity, even with individual capital constraints for
the group members.
On the way of characterising the cohesive risk measures, we will show how admissible
payoffs can be designed in order to offset the liability for each business unit and achieve an
acceptable net worth.
Our problem formulation is connected to the topic of optimal risk transfers based on
convex risk measures. Optimal risk transfers within a group is a topic that has been studied
in a substantial body of literature. We refer to Heath and Ku [10], Barrieu and El Karoui
[2], [3], Jouini et al. [11], Filipovic´ and Kupper [9], Burgert and Ru¨schendorf [4], Embrechts
et al. [8]. In these papers, the problem is formulated generally as
inf
ξ
N∑
i=1
ρi(−ξi)
over all vectors ξ = (ξ1, · · · , ξN) satisfying
∑N
i=1 ξi = η for some η fixed. Note that each
business unit may use a specific risk measure in this framework. The main difference with
the optimal risk transfer literature is to introduce individual risk admissibility constraints
for every unit. At the same time, we consider that the liability at the level of each unit is not
transferable among units and we introduce solvability constraints, namely that payments
can only be made within the limits of the available capital. Further, when the group is
insolvent, we introduce fixed rules for how the payments are to be made. This framework is
similar to the one we have introduced in [5], where the question addressed was the fairness of
insurance contracts in presence of default risk. With similar rules for payments in bankruptcy
and admissibility conditions for the payments, we have shown that it is not possible in
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general to perfectly offset the default risk exposure of the insured agents by proposing them
a benefit participation. The question of when such offsetting payments can take place was
not addressed there and the current paper also brings clarifications in that context.
2. Setup and main definitions
Let us introduce the mathematical setup more clearly. We work in a two date model: time
0 where everything is known and time 1, where randomness is present. Possible outcomes
at time 1 are modelled as random variables on a probability space (Ω,F ,P), considered
to be atomless. Unless otherwise specified, all equalities and inequalities involving random
variables are to be considered in an P a.s. sense. The space of risks occurring at time 1
is considered to be L∞(Ω,F ,P), simply denoted L∞, i.e., the collection of all essentially
bounded random variables.
At time 0, a regulator measures risks by means of a convex functional ρ fulfilling the
properties detailed below.
Definition 1. A mapping ρ : L∞ → R is called a coherent risk measure if the following
properties hold:
(1) if ξ ≥ 0 then ρ(ξ) ≤ 0;
(2) ρ is convex: for all ξ, η ∈ L∞, 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 we have ρ(λξ+(1−λ)η) ≤ λρ(ξ)+(1−λ)ρ(η);
(3) for a ∈ R and ξ ∈ L∞, ρ(ξ + a) = ρ(ξ)− a;
(4) for all 0 ≤ λ ∈ R, ρ(λξ) = λρ(ξ);
(5) (the Fatou property) for any sequence ξn ↓ ξ (with ξn ∈ L
∞) we have ρ(ξn) ↑ ρ(ξ).
We refer to [1], [6], [7] for an interpretation of these mathematical properties and how
they apply to the framework of risk regulation. The main idea is that the regulator only
accepts risks ξ that satisfy ρ(ξ) ≤ 0, hence we say that a random variable ξ is acceptable
whenever ρ(ξ) ≤ 0. Remark that ξ + ρ(ξ) is always acceptable, so that ρ(ξ) is interpreted
as the capital required for the risk ξ. If ρ is coherent then the acceptability set
A := {ξ | ρ(ξ) ≤ 0}
is a convex cone.
The Fatou property allows to apply convex duality theory and establishes a one-to-one
correspondence between a coherent risk measure and a convex closed set S consisting of
probabilities which are absolutely continuous with respect to P (the so called scenario set of
ρ):
Theorem 1. If ρ is coherent, there exists a convex closed set S ⊂ L1, consisting of probability
measures, absolutely continuous with respect to P, such that for all ξ ∈ L∞:
ρ(ξ) = sup
Q∈S
EQ[−ξ].
Conversely each such a set S defines a coherent utility function.
We shall use the assumption that S is weakly compact, so that we will be able to replace
the sup by a max. Indeed, as a direct application of James’s theorem, weak compactness
is equivalent to the nonemptyness of the subgradient of ρ at any point: for every ξ ∈ L∞,
∇ρ(ξ) 6= ∅, that is, there is a Q ∈ S with ρ(ξ) = EQ[−ξ].
An additional assumption that we will use is that the risk measure ρ used by the regulator
is commonotonic.
3
Definition 2. We say that two random variables ξ, η are commonotonic if there exist a
random variable ζ as well as two non-decreasing functions f, g : R → R such that ξ = f(ζ)
and η = g(ζ).
Definition 3. We say that ρ : L∞ → R is commonotonic if for each couple (ξ, η) of com-
monotonic random variables we have ρ(ξ + η) = ρ(ξ) + ρ(η).
Remark 1. Loosely speaking, two risks are commonotonic if they are bets on the same event.
Indeed, ξ and η being nondecreasing functions of ζ , neither of them is a hedge against the
other. The commonotonicity of ρ can therefore be seen as a translation of the rule: if there
is no diversification, there is also no gain in putting these claims together.
Remark 2. If ρ is commonotonic then for nonnegative random variables f, g ∈ L∞ satisfying
P[f > 0, g > 0] = 0 we have that ρ(f + g) = ρ(f) + ρ(g). In particular for ξ ∈ L∞:
ρ(ξ) = ρ(ξ+) + ρ(−ξ−). We also have that for Q ∈ S satisfying ρ(ξ) = EQ[−ξ], necessarily
also ρ(ξ+) = EQ[−ξ+] and ρ(−ξ−) = EQ[ξ−]. This easily follows from the subadditivity of ρ.
All notions above are standard in the theory of risk measures. We now introduce some
definitions that are specific to the framework of this paper, that is the one of a group
consisting of N distinct units under regulatory supervision.
Definition 4. We denote by X the space of N dimensional random variables which are
positive and bounded. We consider a liability vector X = (X1, · · · , XN) ∈ X and consider
m ∈ R+. The class of admissible payoffs from a total capitalm, corresponding to the liability
X is defined as:
AX(m) =
{
Y ∈ X
∣∣∣∣ N∑
i=1
Yi = m; ∀k ∈ {1, ..., N} :
if
∑N
i=1Xi > m then Yk =
Xk∑N
i=1Xi
m
if
∑N
i=1Xi ≤ m then Yk ≥ Xk
}
.
Admissible payoffs respect some rules as follows. If the capital m is less than the aggregate
liability
∑
iXi, the group defaults. In this case, all liabilities have the same priority of
payment, regardless the unit to which they are corresponding. Hence, in default, all capital
m is distributed towards the units proportionally to their liability size. Whenever the group
is solvent at the aggregate level (
∑
iXi ≤ m), every unit must be solvent as well, hence the
central unit distributes for each unit i a payment that should cover the liability Xi. As there
is a surplus in this case, some units will get more than their liability as a payoff.
Example 1. Let us consider that each business unit receives some constant proportion of the
surplus (m −
∑
iXi)
+. The corresponding admissible payoffs (that we shall call standard
payoffs) are given as follows:
Yk =
[
Xk + αk
(
m−
∑
i
Xi
)]
1{
∑
iXi≤m}
+Xk
(
m∑
iXi
)
1{
∑
iXi>m}
, i = 1, . . . , N
(2.1)
where each αk is a nonnegative constant and
∑N
i=1 αi = 1.
Definition 5. Given a level of capital m, an offsetting payoff corresponding to the liability
X ∈ X , is a vector of random variables Y ∈ AX(m) satisfying
Yi −Xi ∈ A for all i ∈ {1, ..., N}. (2.2)
that is, the net worth of any unit is acceptable.
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Offsetting payoffs cannot be achieved when there is not sufficient overall capital m. The
analysis in the next section will reveal the fact that the offsetting payoffs can never be
achieved when the capital m is less than K := ρ(−
∑
iXi), that is the minimal capital re-
quired for the aggregated liability. Also, in general, holding the capital K does not guarantee
the existence of these payoffs, so that the group may be required to hold more capital. This
justifies to introduce the following additional definition:
Definition 6. A coherent risk measure ρ is called cohesive if for any risk vector X ∈ X
there exists Y ∈ AX(ρ(−
∑N
i=1Xi)) such that
Yi −Xi ∈ A for all i ∈ {1, ..., N}. (2.3)
3. Properties of offsetting payoffs with minimal capital
We use the setup and notation from the previous section; in particular ρ is a coherent risk
measure that is commonotonic, with a corresponding scenario set S assumed to be weakly
compact. Also, we shall consider a fixed liability vector X ∈ X and denote the aggregated
group liability by
SX :=
N∑
i=1
Xi.
Also we denote
K := ρ
(
−
N∑
i=1
Xi
)
that is the minimum capital for the aggregated liability. Under individual regulatory con-
straints for the business units, the minimum regulatory capital for the group is denoted
K(X) and its expression was introduced in (1.1).
First observation is that the group needs to hold at least a capital of K.
Lemma 1. The minimal capital for the group K(X) satisfies K(X) ≥ K.
Proof. We assume Y ∈ AX(m) offsetting, that is Yi − Xi ∈ A, or ρ(Yi − Xi) ≤ 0 for all
i ∈ N . From this and the sub-additivity of ρ, we get:
0 ≥
N∑
i=1
ρ(Yi −Xi) ≥ ρ
(
N∑
i=0
(Yi −Xi)
)
= ρ
(
m−
N∑
i=0
Xi
)
= K −m. (3.1)

We now investigate what happens if the company holds a capital of K. Is it possible to
split the capital K in a vector of admissible payoffs Y, so that the net worth Yi−Xi of each
unit i is acceptable? The existence of such payoffs is not granted. Below we show that this
condition is rather restrictive and we characterise the situations where the answer to the
question is positive.
A first remark is that the existence of offsetting payoffs with capital K requires that
no further improvement of the net worth of the business units can be reached by further
diversification. This is what the next lemma says.
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Lemma 2. If the payoff vector Y ∈ AX(K) is offsetting the liability X, then:
N∑
i=0
ρ(Yi −Xi) = ρ
(
N∑
i=0
(Yi −Xi)
)
. (3.2)
Proof. The proof is similar to the one of Lemma 1. It suffices to take m = K in (3.1),
therefore we need to have only equalities. We remark that the admissibility of Y does play
a role in establishing this result only through the condition
∑
i Yi = K 
Proposition 1. Consider a payoff vector Y ∈ AX(K). The following are equivalent:
(i) The payoff vector Y is offsetting the liability X.
(ii) If Q∗ ∈ ∇SX, then for all i ∈ {1, ..., N}:
ρ(Yi −Xi) = EQ∗ [Xi − Yi] = 0. (3.3)
(iii) Relation (3.2) holds and for all i ∈ {1, ..., N}:
EQ∗ [Xi − Yi] = 0. (3.4)
for some Q∗ ∈ ∇SX.
(iv) The following hold: the minimal group capital K(X) satisfies
K = K(X)
and Y is a solution of
inf
ξ∈AX(K)
N∑
i=0
ρ(ξi −Xi).
Proof. (i)⇒(ii). We can apply Proposition 2 below, taking E = {1, . . . , N} and ξi := Yi−Xi.
Indeed, by Lemma 2, the condition in Proposition 2 (1) is fulfilled and it is equivalent to (3).
(ii)⇒(i). Obvious.
(ii)⇒(iii). The relation (3.3) implies that relation (3.2) holds as it can easily checked; also
(3.3) implies (3.4) obviously.
(iii)⇒(ii). If relation (3.2) holds, we can apply Proposition 2 below to deduce that ρ(Yi −
Xi) = EQ∗ [Xi − Yi], for all Q∗ ∈ ∇SX and these expressions are null, again by (iii).
(i)⇔(iv). In general,
∑N
i=0 ρ(ξi −Xi) ≥ ρ
(∑N
i=0(ξi −Xi)
)
so that
inf
ξ∈AX(K)
N∑
i=0
ρ(ξi −Xi) ≥ ρ(K − S
X) = 0.
The condition K = K(X) means that there are offsetting payoff vectors with a capital
K, while from the above inequality we see that whenever there exist such offsetting payoff
vectors, they are solving the minimisation problem (as ρ(Yi−Xi) = 0 whenever Y offsetting
X). Hence the proof is complete. 
Proposition 2. We consider some random variables (ξi)i∈E, with E some countable set and
let QE ∈ ∇ρ
(∑
i∈E ξi
)
. The following are equivalent:
(1)
ρ
(∑
i∈E
ξi
)
=
∑
i∈E
ρ(ξi). (3.5)
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(2) For all λi ≥ 0, i ∈ E
ρ
(∑
i∈E
λiξi
)
=
∑
i∈E
λiρ (ξi) . (3.6)
(3) For all i ∈ E
ρ (ξi) = EQE [−ξi] . (3.7)
Proof. We show (1) ⇒ (3). For any i ∈ E, let Q{i} ∈ S be such that ρ (ξi) = EQ{i} [−ξi] .
Then: ∑
i∈E
ρ(ξi) =
∑
i∈E
EQ{i} [−ξi] ≥
∑
i∈E
EQE [−ξi] = ρ
(∑
i∈E
ξi
)
.
From (3.5), it follows that we must have only equalities above, hence:∑
i∈E
(
EQ{i} [−ξi]− EQE [−ξi]
)
= 0,
which implies (as all terms in the above sum are nonnegative) that ρ (ξi) = EQ{i} [−ξi] =
EQE [−ξi].
Now, we show (3)⇒ (2). Using the linearity of the expectation and (3.7) we obtain:
ρ
(∑
i∈E
λiξi
)
≥ EQE
[
−
∑
i∈E
λiξi
]
=
∑
i∈S
λiρ(ξi). (3.8)
On the other hand, ρ being convex we also have for all λi ≥ 0:
ρ
(∑
i∈E
λiξi
)
≤
∑
i∈E
λiρ(ξi) (3.9)
Combining (3.8) and (3.9) we get the equality (3.6).
The implication (2)⇒ (1) is trivial, hence the proof is complete.

Proposition 1 (ii) emphasizes that a payoff vector Y satisfying EQ∗ [Xi − Yi] = 0 with
Q∗ ∈ ∇ρ(−SX) is a potential candidate to be an offsetting payoff (necessary condition).
It follows that when payoffs are standard, i.e., as in (2.1), the proportions (αi) can be
identified via these equalities. Their expressions are given below in Proposition 3, together
with another necessary and sufficient condition for these to be indeed offsetting vectors. To
be noted that this time we will use commonotonicity of the risk measure ρ to obtain this
condition, the previous results remaining true also when ρ not commonotonic.
Proposition 3. The minimal capital for the group K(X) satisfies K(X) = K if and only if
ρ
(
−
(
K − SX
)−)
=
N∑
i=1
ρ
(
−
Xi
SX
(K − SX)−
)
. (3.10)
If this condition is satisfied, then Y is offsetting X, where Y is a standard payoff (see (2.1))
with
∀i : αi : =
EQ∗
[
Xi
SX
(K − SX)−
]
EQ∗ [(K − SX)+]
=
EQ∗
[
Xi
SX
(SX −K)+
]
EQ∗ [(SX −K)+]
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where Q∗ ∈ ∇ρ(−SX).
Proof. By Proposition 1 (iii), Y˜ ∈ AX(K) is ofsetting X if and only if the condition (3.2) is
satisfied together with EQ∗ [Y˜i −Xi] = 0 for all i.
Using the commonotonicity of ρ we obtain that an equivalent expression for (3.2) is (ap-
plied to Y˜): ρ
( N∑
i=1
Y˜i −Xi
)+− N∑
i=1
ρ
(
(Y˜i −Xi)
+
)
+
ρ
−( N∑
i=1
Y˜i −Xi
)−− N∑
i=1
ρ
(
−(Y˜i −Xi)
−
) = 0
and because of the subadditivity property of ρ each of the two expressions in the brackets is
smaller or equal to 0. It follows the equivalent expression of (3.2) is:
ρ
( N∑
i=1
Y˜i −Xi
)+ = N∑
i=1
ρ
(
(Y˜i −Xi)
+
)
(3.11)
and
ρ
−( N∑
i=1
Y˜i −Xi
)− = N∑
i=1
ρ
(
−(Y˜i −Xi)
−
)
. (3.12)
We notice that because Y˜ is admissible, the expression (3.12) equals (3.10), so that the
condition (3.10) is necessary for the existence of ofsetting payoffs. We now show that it a
sufficient condition. Indeed, we can always choose Y˜ = Y with Y standard and as stated in
the proposition, we have that the random variables (Yi−Xi)+ = αi(K−SX)+, ∀i = 1, ..., N .
We then use the commonotonicity property of ρ to conclude that (3.11) is verified. The
particular proportions αi are found through the equality EQ∗ [Yi−Xi] = 0 Proposition 1 (ii).
Hence, once (3.10) is verified, the vector Y fulfils the necessary and sufficient conditions to
be offsetting. 
4. A class of cohesive risk measures
We consider a random variable H ≥ 0 that satisfies 1 ≤ EP[H ] < ∞ and introduce the
risk measure:
ρH(ξ) := sup
Q∈SH
EQ[−ξ] (4.1)
with a scenario set:
SH :=
{
Q | 0 ≤
dQ
dP
≤ H P a.s.
}
(4.2)
The main result in this subsection is that all cohesive risk measures that are commonotonic
have this representation. A generalisation of these risk measures will follow afterwards.
Before we prove this result, we give some alternative characterisations of ρH :
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Proposition 4. (1) Let us denote EP[H ] = h and introduce the probability measure H≪
P as:
dH
dP
:=
H
h
.
For any ξ ∈ L∞ we have:
ρH(ξ) = AV@R(H,1/h)(ξ),
i.e., the average value at risk for ξ, at the level 1/h and under the probability H. We
recall AV@R(P,λ)(ξ) is defined as:
AV@R(P,λ)(ξ) = max
Q∈Sλ
EQ[−ξ],
where Sλ is the set of all probability measures Q ≪ P whose density dQ/dP is P
a.s. bounded by 1/λ.
(2) For any ξ ∈ L∞ we have:
ρH(ξ) = EQξ [−ξ]
for a probability Qξ satisfying:
dQξ
dP
=

H on {ξ < q}
c
h
H on {ξ = q}
0 on {ξ > q},
(4.3)
with q = inf{x : EP [H1ξ≤x] ≥ 1} and:
c =
{
0 if EP[H1ξ=q] = 0
1−EP[H1ξ<q ]
EP[H1ξ=q]
otherwise.
Proof.
ρH(ξ) = sup {−EP[ϕξ] | 0 ≤ ϕ ≤ H , EP[ϕ] = 1}
= sup {−EH[ψξ] | 0 ≤ ψ ≤ h , EH[ψ] = 1}
= AV@R(H,1/h)(ξ).
and we proved (1). By applying the Neyman-Pearson lemma, one can show (2). For more
details, see also next section, where a generalisation appears, or Subsection 4.4 in [7]. 
Because AV@R is commonotonic it follows that
Corollary 1. The risk measure ρH is commonotonic.
We are now ready to prove the main result of this section.
Proposition 5. A commonotonic risk measure ρ satisfying the weak compactness property
is cohesive if and only if it has the representation (4.1) for some random variable H ∈ L1(P).
Proof. We first proof that ρH is cohesive. The risk measure ρH is commonotonic (Corrollary
1) and clearly satisfies the weak compactness property. It is cohesive if for any given liability
vector X offsetting payoffs exist. For X ∈ X and SX =
∑
iXi, let Q
∗ be such that K =
ρH(−SX) = EQ∗ [SX]. It is sufficient to show that for arbitrary X ∈ X and for Y as in
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Proposition 3, the conditions Yi−Xi ∈ A, ∀ i ∈ {1, ..., N} are satisfied. By construction the
condition EQ∗(Xi − Yi) = 0 is satisfied for all i ≥ 1 and it remains to prove:
ρH(Yi −Xi) = EQ∗(Xi − Yi). (4.4)
We recall that Q∗ is defined as in (4.3) where h = EP[H ]. With a slight change in notation,
let q be such that P[SX ≥ q] ≥ 1/h ≥ P[SX > q]. Then Q∗[{SX < q}] = 0 and Q∗[SX >
K] = EP
[
H1{SX>K}
]
(since obviously K ≥ q).
For i ≥ 1 and Q ∈ S we have:
EQ[Xi − Yi] = −
∫
SX<K
αi(K − S
X)dQ+
∫
SX>K
Xi
SX
(SX −K)
(
dQ
dP
)
dP
≤ αiρ(−(K − S
X)+) +
∫
SX>K
Xi
SX
(SX −K)HdP
≤ αiEQ∗ [(K − S
X)+] +
∫
SX>K
Xi
SX
(SX −K)HdP
= EQ∗ [Xi − Yi]
We have used the fact that ρ(−(K − SX)+) = EQ∗ [(K − SX)+], which is a consequence of
the commonotonicity of ρH (Corollary 1). From the above inequality we obtain (4.4), for
i ∈ {1, ..., N}.
We now take ρ cohesive, commonotonic, S weakly compact and prove that ρ = ρH for some
H ∈ L1, that is, there is a random variable H so that for any random variable ξ ∈ L∞, we
have:
ρ(ξ) = EQξ [−ξ] (4.5)
where Qξ is given in (4.3).
Because ρ is commonotonic, its values are determined by the expression for sets. This
brings us to the following reduction: find a random variable 0 ≤ H ∈ L1 such that for all
B ∈ F
ρ(−1B) = EP [H1B] ∧ 1 = ρ
H(−1B). (4.6)
The natural candidate is of course H = supQ∈S
dQ
dP
and we will show that this function indeed
works. As a result we then get S = SH . The sup has to be understood in the measure
theoretic sense and the reader who is not familiar with this concept can find the information
in a course on measure theory. However the proof below gives sufficient information to
overcome the difficulties.
Let us first take A ∈ F such
ρ(−1A) ∈ (0, 1) (4.7)
We consider a partition of A, τ(A) = {A1, A2} ⊂ F , the risks X1 := 1A1, X2 := 1A2 and
their sum SX = X1 +X2 = 1A. We let
K := ρ
(
−
∑
i
Xi
)
= ρ (−1A) ,
and K ∈ (0, 1) due to (4.7). This in turn leads to A = {SX > K} and Ac = {SX < K}.
There is QA ∈ ∇ρ(−1A) with ρ(−1A) = QA[A]. Hence ρ(1Ac) = ρ(1−1A) = −1+ρ(−1A) =
−QA[Ac]. As ρ is cohesive, there exist offsetting payoffs for the risk X = (X1, X2, 0, .., 0).
10
We now consider Y ∈ AX(K) standard payoffs offsetting X, with Yi = 0 for i > 2. The
residual risks of the units i = 1, 2 are given by
Xi − Yi = −αiK1Ac + (1−K)1Ai.
By commonotonicity of ρ and of the random variables (Yi − Xi)+ and −(Yi − Xi)− the
following hold (for i = 1, 2):
ρ(Yi −Xi) = ρ
(
(Yi −Xi)
+
)
+ ρ
(
−(Yi −Xi)
−
)
= αiKρ(1Ac) + (1−K)ρ(−1Ai)
= −αiKQ
A[Ac] + (1−K)ρ(−1Ai)
while by Proposition 1 we also know that for QA ∈ ∇ρ(−1A):
ρ(Yi −Xi) = −αiKQ
A(Ac) + (1−K)QA(Ai) = 0. (4.8)
Therefore (remember that 0 < K < 1),
ρ (−1Ai) = Q
A(Ai), ∀Ai ∈ τ(A).
We emphasize that the probability QA is chosen independently of the partition of the set A,
τ(A). That means: if QA ∈ ∇ρ (−1A) then:
ρ(−1B) = Q
A(B), ∀B ⊂ A. (4.9)
From (4.9) we deduce that for all probabilities measures Q ∈ S
dQA
dP
1A ≥
dQ
dP
1A P a.s.,
that is, dQ
A
dP
1A ≥ H1A, and because QA ∈ S we must get equality. That means that if (4.7)
holds we have dQ
A
dP
= H on the set A. In other words
ρ(−1A) = E[H1A].
For general sets B ∈ F , we distinguish between several cases.
(a) If B ∈ F is such that ρ(−1B) ∈ (0, 1), then ρ(−1B) = E[H1B], as was proved above.
(b) If B ∈ F satisfies ρ(−1B) = 0, then, B is a null set for all probabilities in S,
consequently H1B = 0 P a.s. and in a trivial way ρ(−1B) = EP[H1B].
(c) If B ∈ F satisfies ρ(−1B) = 1 we will use the weak compactness and the property that
the probability space is atomless. There is a nondecreasing family of sets At; 0 ≤ t ≤ 1
such that P[At] = tP[B] and A1 = B. The Lebesgue property (weak compactness)
then shows that the function t → ρ(−1At) is continuous. It is nondecreasing, starts
at 0 and ends at 1. Therefore there is a unique number s ≤ 1 such that for t < s,
ρ(−1At) < 1 and for t ≥ s, ρ(−1At) = 1. For t < s we have ρ(−1At) = E[H1At ] and
by continuity we get 1 = ρ(−1As) = E[H1As]. Since As ⊂ B we have 1 = ρ(−1B) =
E[H1B] ∧ 1.
We thus have verified (4.6). We must still show that H ∈ L1. This is rather obvious since
ρ(−1{H>n}) = E[H1{H>n}] ∧ 1 and the left side tends to 0 as n → ∞. Hence eventually
E[H1{H>n}] < 1 <∞ and H ∈ L
1. 
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Corollary 2. Suppose that the risk measure ρ is commonotonic, satisfies the weak compact-
ness property, is cohesive and law determined (rearrangement invariant). Then ρ is a tail
expectation, i.e. there is a level α with ρ = AV@R(P,α).
Indeed if ρ(ξ) is determined by the distribution of ξ, then the set S must be rearrangement
invariant, i.e. if f ∈ S and g has the same distribution as f , then also g ∈ S. It is easy to
see (for an atomless space) that this implies that the function H constructed above, must
be a constant. This is nothing else than the characterisation of AV@R.
Remark 3. For a scenario set S we can introduce a space of random variables. We define
E = {ξ | for all Q ∈ S : EQ[|ξ|] <∞}.
For elements ξ ∈ E we have that also ρ(−|ξ|) = supQ∈S EQ[|ξ|] < ∞ and this expression
defines a norm for which E becomes a Banach space. Examples show that in general L∞ is
not dense in this space. The risk measure ρ has a natural extension to E. Indeed we can
define ρ(ξ) = supQ∈S EQ[−ξ]. In case 0 < H ∈ L
1(P),E[H ] ≥ 1, the scenario set SH also
defines such a space which in this case is easy to describe. As for tail expectation we have
the following inequalities∫
|ξ| dH ≤ ρ(−|ξ|) ≤ h
∫
|ξ| dH where h = E[H ] and dH =
H
h
dP.
It follows that the space E is nothing else but the space L1(H), with an equivalent norm.
5. Cohesion for fixed aggregated liability
Above, we analysed group cohesion when the class of possible liability vectors is X . We
now suppose that the overall (or aggregated) group liability is fixed and equals Z ∈ L∞
so that the class of all possible liability vectors becomes: {X ∈ X |
∑N
i=1Xi = Z}. We
generalise the class of risk measures from the previous section as follows. We define:
ρL,H(ξ) := sup
Q∈SL,H
EQ[−ξ], (5.1)
with a scenario set:
SL,H :=
{
Q : L ≤
dQ
dP
≤ H P a.s.
}
, (5.2)
and where L,H are nonnegative random variables that satisfy 0 ≤ L ≤ H , with E[H ] <∞
and E[L] > 0. From the calculations below it will turn out that this risk measure is also
commonotonic. We shall denote ℓ := E[L] and h := E[H ]. We suppose ℓ < 1 and h > 1 in
order to exclude the trivial case SL,H = P. We introduce the following probability measures:
dH
dP
:=
H − L
h− ℓ
and
dL
dP
:=
L
ℓ
1{ℓ>0} + 1{ℓ=0}. (5.3)
For a given random variable ξ, we define a probability measure Qξ as follows:
dQξ
dP
:=

H on {ξ < q(ξ)}
c(ξ)H + (1− c(ξ))L on {ξ = q(ξ)}
L on {ξ > q(ξ)}
(5.4)
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with q(ξ) and c(ξ) being constants (derived from the distribution of ξ) to ensure that
EP
[
dQξ
dP
]
= 1. These constants can be computed as follows. Let us denote:
F (ξ, x) := EP [H1ξ≤x + L1ξ>x] = ℓ+ EP [(H − L)1ξ≤x] .
The function F (ξ, ·) is increasing, right continuous, and satisfies limx→−∞ F (ξ, x) = ℓ ≥ 0
and limx→∞ F (ξ, x) = h ≥ 1. We denote:
q(ξ) := inf{x : F (ξ, x) ≥ 1} (5.5)
and define c(ξ) as satisfying c(ξ)F (q(ξ)) + (1− c(ξ))F (q(ξ)−) = 1, that is:
c(ξ) =
{
0 if F is continuous at q(ξ)
1−F (q(ξ)−)
F (q(ξ))−F (q(ξ)−)
otherwise.
(5.6)
We observe that indeed EP
[
dQξ
dP
]
= c(ξ)F (q(ξ)) + (1− c(ξ))F (q(ξ)−) = 1 as required for Qξ
to be a probability measure.
Proposition 6. For any ξ ∈ L∞ we have the following alternative representations for ρL,H :
ρL,H(ξ) = ℓEL[−ξ] + (1− ℓ)AV@R(H,γ)(ξ).
for γ = (1− ℓ)/(h− ℓ)) < 1 and
ρL,H(ξ) = EQξ [−ξ],
where Qξ defined in (5.4).
Proof. We have by definition:
ρL,H(ξ) = sup {−EP[ϕξ] | L ≤ ϕ ≤ H , EP[ϕ] = 1} (5.7)
Using the transformation ψ := (ϕ−L)(h−ℓ)
(H−L)(1−ℓ)
we obtain that {L ≤ ϕ ≤ H , EP[ϕ] = 1} =
{0 ≤ ψ ≤ h−ℓ
1−ℓ
, EH[ψ] = 1} and:
EP[ϕξ] = EP[Lξ] + EP[(ϕ− L)ξ]
= ℓEP
[
ξ
dL
dP
]
+ (1− ℓ)EP
[
ψξ
dH
dP
]
= ℓEL[ξ] + (1− ℓ)EH[ψξ].
Therefore, an equivalent expression for ρL,H is:
ρL,H(ξ) = ℓEL[−ξ] + (1− ℓ) sup
{
−EH[ϕξ] | 0 ≤ ϕ ≤
h− ℓ
1− ℓ
, EH[ϕ] = 1
}
= ℓEL[ξ] + (1− ℓ)AV@R(H,γ)(ξ),
where AV@R(H,γ)(−ξ) is the average value at risk for −ξ, at the level γ = (1 − ℓ)/(h− ℓ))
and under the probability H.We notice that γ < 1 ads h > 1. The optimiser probability for
AV@R is known to be Qξ:
dQξ
dH
=
1
γ
(1ξ<q + c1ξ=q) ,
13
with q a γ quantile of ξ under H and c = 0 if H(ξ = q) = 0 and c = (γ −H(ξ < q)) /H(ξ = q)
otherwise. Writing dQ
ξ
dH
× dH
dP
we obtain the expression (5.4) with the constants q = q(ξ) and
c = c(ξ).

Proposition 7. Consider the regulator’s risk measure is ρ = ρL,H . Let Z ∈ L∞+ with q(−Z)
the corresponding constant, as defined in (5.5). Suppose further that
ρL,H(−Z) ≥ −q(−Z),
(for this inequality to hold it is sufficient that AV@R(H,γ)(−Z) ≤ EL[Z]). Then, for all risk
vectors X satisfying
∑N
i=1Xi = Z, the following equality is satisfied
K(X) = ρ(−Z).
Proof. Let us denote K = ρL,H(−Z) and Q∗ be the probability in (5.4) with ξ = −Z. If
K ≥ −q(−Z), then {Z > K} ⊂ {Z > −q(−Z)} = {−Z < q(−Z)} = {dQ
∗
dP
= H}.
For any X ∈ X satisfying
∑N
i=1Xi = Z and for any corresponding vector Y ∈ A
X(K), we
have: ∀i {Xi > Yi} ⊂ {Z > K}. Therefore, we obtain:
ρ(−(Yi −Xi)
−) = EQ∗
[
−(Yi −Xi)
−
]
= EP
[
−(Yi −Xi)
−H
]
.
It follows that the condition (3.10) is satisfied and, as ρL,H is commonotonic, the equality
K(X) = ρ(−Z) holds as an application of Proposition 3.
It remains to prove the claim that if AV@R(H,γ)(−Z) ≤ EL[Z] then ρ
L,H(−Z) ≥ −q(−Z).
We have that −q(−Z) ≤ AV@RH,γ(−Z) (this is always true). Then, the condition
AV@R(H,γ)(−Z) ≤ EL[Z] implies AV@R(H,γ)(−Z) ≤ ρ(−Z), and hence the claim is proved.

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